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This chapter offers a selective survey of the gravity equation (GE) in international trade. 
This equation started in the Sixties as a purely empirical proposition to explain bilateral 
trade flows, without little or no theoretical underpinnings. At the end of the Seventies, the 
GE was “legitimized” by a series of theoretical articles that demonstrated that the basic 
GE form was consistent with various models of trade flows. Empirical applications of GE 
expanded to cover a variety of issues, such as the impact of regional trade agreements, 
national borders and currency unions on trade, as well as the use of the equation to sort 
out the relative merit of alternative trade theories. A new wave of studies is now 
concentrating on the general equilibrium properties of the GE and finer econometrics 
points. The renewed interest of the academic profession in the development of the GE is 
undoubtedly driven by the equation’s empirical success. 
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International economics and international business have common interests but somewhat 
different research agendas. The former emphasizes cross-border trade and capital flows, 
whereas the latter looks predominantly at foreign direct investment. Part of this 
difference results from the emphasis that scholars in international business place on the 
study of the multinational firm and part is due to intellectual specialization. It is worth 
recalling that the yearly flows of international trade are a large multiple of the yearly 
flows of foreign direct investment, while the stock of foreign direct investment has only 
recently approached annual trade flows (see Figure 1). Furthermore, total real exports 
have grown faster, on average, than the world real GDP since the mid-1980s (see Figure 
2). Finally, it is widely believed that exports are an engine of economic growth; see 
Krueger (2006). For all these reasons, international trade economists spend a great deal of 
time and resources understanding and explaining trade flows.    




Sources: International Monetary Fund (2006) and  UNCTAD, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ 
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With this brief background, I can state the objectives and outline of the chapter. 
The objective is to explain trade flows in terms of the gravity equation (GE). The reason 
for focusing on GE is two fold. The first is that GE, unlike other frameworks, has had 
great empirical success in explaining bilateral trade flows. For a long time, however, GE 
was a child without a father in the sense that it was thought to have no theoretical 
support. Since the late 1970s, this state of affairs has changed radically. Now, the gravity 
equation has strong theoretical support and can be derived from a variety of models of 
international trade. The second is that GE can be used to sort out alternative hypotheses 
of international trade. 
In its simplest form, the gravity equation (GE) explains flows of a good between 
pairs of countries in terms of the countries’ incomes, distance and a host of idiosyncratic 
factors--such as common border, common language, and common money-- that enhance 
or reduce bilateral trade flows: 
 
(1)            ijk ij k j k i k ijk U d Y Y A M
k k k 3 2 1
0
α α α = , 
 
where Mijk denotes that the k good is exported by country i and imported by country j, Yik 
and Yjk are expenditures on the k good by the two countries, and d is distance; A and αs  
are coefficients, and U is a well behaved error term. The vector of idiosyncratic factors 
has been omitted in (1) because these factors are more control variables than theoretically 
derived variables.  Aggregating over all k goods, the GE of a given product can be 





(2)             ij ij j i ijk U d Y Y A M
3 2 1
0
α α α = ,  
where the k subscript has been suppressed and Y is the country’s income (for example, 
nominal gross domestic product or GDP). The implications of GE –which we develop 
and discuss below-- are such that α1 and α2 are positive and in some instances equal to 
one and that α3 is negative. Typically, equation (2) is specified in log linear form and 
estimated either with cross-section or panel data. In the latter case, a time subscript τ is 
added, except for the time-invariant physical distance: 
 
(3)           ln(Mijτ) = α 0 + α1ln(Yiτ) + α2ln(Yjτ) + α3ln(dij) + α4 Fij + uijτ, 
 
where ln stands for the natural logarithm, ln(A0) = α 0 and uijt = ln(Uijτ). The vector of 
idiosyncratic factors, Fij, has also been added to equation (3). These factors are typically 
measured as dummy variables that acquire the value of one for the existence of the 
phenomenon and zero for its absence. The coefficients α1 through α3 are interpreted as 
elasticities or as percentage changes in bilateral trade for one percentage change in 
income and distance. The coefficient α4 is positive if the factor is trade enhancing (e.g., 
common language) and negative if trade reducing (e.g., terrorism). 
  In the following section I will explore different models of international trade from 
which GE can be derived, ranging from models of complete specialization and identical 
consumers’ preferences (Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Deardorff 1998) to models of 
product differentiation in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman 1987) to 




1989; Evenett and Keller 2002) to models of incomplete specialization and trading costs 
(Haveman and Hummels 2004).  
 
II. TRADE THEORY AND THE GE 
Complete specialization 
Specialization is at the heart of trade theory; it is complete or deepest when each country 
specializes in the production of its own output and consumers purchase the output of each 
country according to identical and homothetic preferences. Furthermore, trade occurs 
without friction, meaning that it is not impeded either by transport costs, tariffs or tariff-
equivalent border obstacles. This idealized set-up serves the purpose of creating a 
benchmark of maximum trade flows. Each country imports and consumes a share of the 
goods produced by all other countries, as well as a share of its own output. These shares 
are the same for all countries. Consider, for example, two countries, country 1 and 
country 2, producing differentiated products by country of origin. Country 1 will export 
its own good to country 2 in the amount of M12 = b1Y2, where b1 = marginal propensity to 
import good 1 in country 2. Country 1 will also sell b1Y1 amount of the good it produces 
to domestic consumers. Note that the propensity to consume good 1 is the same across all 
consumers regardless of location. Income of country 1 is the sum of purchases by 
consumers located in country 1 and consumers located in country 2, i.e., Y1 =  b1Y1 + 
b1Y2 = b1Yw, where Yw =   world income = Y1 + Y2. Thus, identical and homothetic 
preferences imply that the propensity to import and consume good 1 is equal to country 
1’s share of world income. Replacing b1 with Y1/ Yw, M12 = Y1Y2/ Yw. This is the simple 





(4)     Mij = YiYj/Yw.  
 
Bilateral trade flows respond positively to the incomes of the trading partner with a unit 
elasticity (one percent change in Y raises M by one percent) and negatively to world 
income. Referring to our empirical GE (3) and ignoring all other variables, complete 
specialization in trade implies that α1 = α2 = 1 and that the intercept of the regression can 
be interpreted as -ln(Yw). 
  Introduce now trading costs ---a collection of costs that includes transaction, 
transport, and border-related costs-- such that exports are valued Mij (f.o.b. prices) in 
country i but Mij tij (c.i.f. prices) in country j, where tij = (1 + trading costs per unit of 
exports). For the importing country, Mij is now equal to YiYj/ tij Yw. Trading costs are not 
observable and the usual assumption is to proxy these costs by the distance separating the 
two countries, dij: more precisely, 
3 / 1
α
ij ij d t = , with α3 < 0. The end result is that with 
trade frictions, bilateral trade flows fall by 1/ tij or 
3 α
ij d  relative to the frictionless world 
of equation (4): 
 
(5)     Mij = YiYj/ tij Yw. 
 
Monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade 
Complete specialization is the natural outcome of models of monopolistic competition 




(Helpman and Krugman 1985). Consumers like varieties and firms respond by 
differentiating their products by investing in a brand name. Separate markets develop for 
each of the differentiated products with the producer gaining some monopoly power and 
an ability to exploit economies of scale. As countries develop and mature, the demand for 
varieties increases and international trade tends to occur within the same industry. The 
industry has to be defined at a high level of disaggregation to avoid that different 
products may fall under the same classification. Trade overlap is measured typically with 
the Grubel-Lloyd index, which is the industry sum of twice the minimum of bilateral 
import values for each industry as a proportion of bilateral imports. The index is 
comprised between a minimum of zero for no intra-industry and a maximum of one fro 
complete intra-industry trade. A single-country measure of intra-industry trade activity is 
obtained by taking the weighted averages of bilateral indices. Data compiled by the 
OECD (2002, Table 2), at the fairly aggregated 2-digit SITC level, show  that the average 
intra-industry trade of the 29 member countries exceeded 60 per cent of total 
manufacturing industry trade in the period 1996-2000.
1 Lionel Fontagné and Michael 
Freudenberg (1999) analyze 10,000 products at the highly disaggregated 8-digit category 
of the Combined Nomenclature of Eurostat for European countries for 1980, 1987, and 
1994. Product similarity or overlap is judged in terms of differences in unit values. If 
export and import unit values differ by less than 15 per cent, the cross-border flows are 
defined as intra-industry trade. Based on this criterion, in 1994 intra-industry trade as a 
proportion of total intra-EU trade was close to 70 per cent for France, Germany, and 
Belgium-Luxembourg, 50 per cent for Italy and Spain and 14 per cent for Greece. 
                                                 




Furthermore, when these authors aggregate the 10,000 products into 14 industries, they 
find that intra-industry trade rises, over time, in all sectors except for agriculture and 
automobiles.  
Helhanan Helpman (1987), drawing on his work with Paul Krugman (Helpman 
and Krugman 1985, ch. 8), develops a model that directly addresses intra-industry trade.
2 
The key testable implication is that intra-industry trade responds positively, not only to 
the level of aggregate income, but also to the degree of income similarity among trading 
partners. More specifically, for a group of developed countries, such as those belonging 
to the OECD, Helpman develops and tests the following equation: 
 
(6) XA/ YA = (YA/ Yw)[1 - ∑jєA(bj,A)
2], 
 
where XA = trade inside the designated group A (e.g., OECD countries), YA = income of 
group A, and bj,A = income share of country j in group A. The expression in squared 
brackets measures the degree of income asymmetries in the designated group of 
countries. If one country were to be extremely big in relation to the others, ∑jєA(bj, A)
2 
would approach unity and the expression in the squared brackets would tend to zero. As 
countries in the group become less asymmetric in income, the expression in squared 
brackets rises. Thus, the more symmetric the group’s countries are, the larger is the trade 
volume within the group. David Hummels and James Levinsohn (1995, pp. 804-5) test a 
slightly modified (6) applied to country pairs: 
                                                                                                                                                 
cent for Ireland.  
2 The GE from a model of product differentiation and monopolistic competition was also 






 α1ln[Yi+j (1 – bi
2 – bj
2)] + ln (Yi+j/Yw), 
 
where Mi+j is the volume of trade in the country pair and Yi+j is the income in the two-
country region. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) captures the impact of the 
country pair’s income on bilateral trade. The income variable is corrected by the 
symmetry factor (1 – bi
2 – bj
2). As countries become more similar the impact of income 
on bilateral flows rises. The second term of equation (7) captures the share of the pair’s 
income in world income. The empirical results show that (7) works just as well for non-
OECD as it does for OECD countries. Since intra-industry trade is small among 
developing countries, one must infer that there is more than differentiated goods in 
driving trade flows.  
 
Hecksher-Ohlin 
Equation (4) has also been derived from the perspective of the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) 
theory of comparative advantage (Deardorff 1998). This theory, as every undergraduate 
student of international economics and business knows, underscores the importance of a 
country’s relative resources in determining its comparative advantage. In the H-O world, 
goods are homogeneous and perfect competition prevails. H-O predicts that a country 
will export those goods that require a relative intensive use of the endowed input. 
Capital-rich countries enjoy a lower cost of capital relative to wages and tend to export 
capital-intensive products; the reverse is true for labor-rich countries. There is also a 
                                                                                                                                                 




strong version of the H-O model, one in which input prices –i.e., cost of capital and 
wages—are equalized across countries. In this case, every country uses the same ratios of 
inputs and product prices do not differ. The amount of trade is not determinate. How is it 
then possible to determine bilateral trade flows predicted by the incomes of the two 
trading partners, as in our equation (4)? Deardorff arrives at a solution by invoking the 
principle of random separation of imports and exports. In his own words (pp. 12-3): “If 
consumers draw [randomly]…, then the law of large numbers will allow to predict quite 
accurately what their total choices will be by using expected values. In general, these 
expected values will be appropriate averages of the wide variety of outcomes that are in 
fact possible in the model.”
3 An alternative route to arrive at (4), using the H-O 
framework, would consider complete specialization emanating from large differences in 
factor composition, a theme on which we will return later in the paper. 
 
Incomplete specialization 
So far, we have seen the gravity equation from complete specialization models. These 
models predict that a producer of a given good will supply all consumers or all countries. 
Consequently, we should note that the matrix of bilateral trade is full in the sense that an 
exporter will satisfy all importers. What is the evidence on this score? Ideally, as 
Haveman and Hummels point out (2004, p. 213), we would want to have data showing 
the complete range of varieties produced and cases when a country produces a good but 
                                                 
3 Even though production costs are the same across countries, capital-rich countries will 
produce a disproportionate share of capital-intensive goods, and the opposite for labor-
intensive countries. Thus, although factor prices are equalized, with consumers having 
identical and homothetic preferences, the main H-O prediction holds (Helpman 1989, p. 




fails to export it. This information is unfortunately not available. The procedure adopted 
by Haveman and Hummels is to define a good at a 4-digt SITC category, compute the 
number of exporters of good k for each importer and then divide this number by the total 
number of exporters of good k. Under complete specialization, this number should be 
equal to one. Instead, these authors find that 27 per cent of the sample has zero values 
and 58 per cent of importers buy from fewer than 10 per cent of available exporters.
4 In 
sum, the foundation upon which complete specialization is based may be a bit shaky. The 
next step involves deriving the gravity equation from the alternative perspective of 
incomplete specialization, an environment in which consumers buy a sub-set of available 
varieties or there are multiple suppliers of homogeneous goods. 
  Simon Evenett and Wolfgang Keller (2002) derive two GE-like testable models 
from incomplete specialization. In the first one, the setting is H-O but restricted to two 
goods, two factors, and two countries. The restriction is essential because in a more 
plausible many-country environment bilateral trade flows with multiple suppliers (in a 
frictionless world) would be indeterminate. The two countries have different capital to 
labor ratios and export different goods. Their bilateral exports will depend not only on 
income, as in equation (4), but also on the share of the two goods in production (see 
equation 3 in Evenett and Keller): 
 (8) Mij =
 (bi – bj)/(YiYj/Yw), 
where b defines the share of one of the two goods in production. Say b defines the share 
of the capital-intensive good and country i is relatively rich in capital, then bi > bj and 
exports of the capital-intensive good go from i to j. For the labor-intensive good, the 
                                                 
4




shares are (1 - bi) and (1 - bj), respectively; exports of the labor-intensive good flow from 
j to i. As the factor mix in the two countries converge, bi and bj become more equal and 
bilateral trade peters out. In the limit, in the absence of differences in factor endowments, 
trade disappears altogether. Note that (8) implies a lower elasticity of trade with respect 
to income than equation (4) derived from complete specialization. 
   The alternative way to generate a GE from incomplete specialization is to assume 
that a country produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale, as 
envisioned in the H-O world, as well as a differentiated good under increasing returns to 
scale, as envisioned by the New Trade Theory. In this case, the testable implication is 
(see Evenett and Keller, equation 2): 
(9) Mij =
 (1 – bi)/(YiYj/Yw), 
where bi is the share of the homogeneous good in country i. As bi approaches zero, 
equation (9) converges to equation (4).  
It is useful to compare equation (4), derived under complete specialization and 
trading costs, with equation (8), derived under a restrictive H-O environment, and with a 
specialized H-O environment, and with equation (9), derived under a mixed environment 
of differentiated good and H-O. Income predicts the highest trade volume in the complete 
specialization case, followed by the mixed case, and lastly by the restricted H-O model; 
see Evenett and Keller (2002, pp. 286-7). We shall return to this point in the next section.  
                                                                                                                                                 




III. THE EMPIRICAL GE  
The GE has been very successful in explaining actual trade patterns; in fact, it is 
considered to be state of the art for the determination of bilateral trade (Leamer and 
Levinsohn 1995, p. 1384; Feenstra et al. 2001, p. 431). There is a voluminous literature 
on the empirical GE going back to the early 1960s, far too big to be reviewed within the 
space of a chapter. The approach I shall follow is to select some themes that are germane 
to the theory presented above.  
 
GE and alternative trade theories 
 Among the various uses of the GE, one of the most promising is to employ it so as to 
discriminate among alternative theories of international trade. This is what Feenstra et al 
(2001) do. These authors fit a GE of the form of equation (3) to 4-digit SITC level trade 
data from Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer (WTA). The disaggregated data are 
grouped in three categories following Rauch’s (1999) methodology. The first group 
consists of homogeneous goods traded in exchanges and whose prices are very 
transparent; the second group consists of reference-price goods whose prices can be 
obtained in industry publications; and the third group consists of ‘differentiated’ goods 
with unquoted prices. In other words, products are ranked by degree of homogeneity and 
price transparency. Both homogeneous and differentiated goods industries have barriers 
to entry. Entry barriers in the homogeneous good industries tend to be more in the form 
of large fixed costs of capital outlays, where in the differentiated goods industry are in the 
form of fixed costs to develop brand names. If entry barriers are uncorrelated across 




α2 of equation (3) are not significantly different from each other. The authors consider 
two alternative hypotheses to Ho: one (H1) in which entry barriers are higher in the 
differentiated goods industry than in the homogeneous goods industry and the other (H2) 
where entry barriers are higher in the homogenous goods industry. Under H1, α1 < α2; the 
higher income elasticity of the importer can be intuitively justified by what is called a 
‘reverse’ home market effect. Under H2, α1 > α2; the higher income elasticity of the 
exporter can be intuitively justified by what is called a home market effect. The evidence 
presented by the authors rejects the statistical equality of the two alpha coefficients. The 
estimated α1 (exporter’s income) rises as one moves from homogeneous to reference-
priced goods to differentiated goods. In the homogeneous category, α1 is below α2, 
whereas the opposite is true for differentiated goods. In sum, the evidence is strongest for 
H2, that is the environment where barriers to entry are highest, such as in sectors like 
mining and steel. 
 
Complete vs. incomplete specialization 
There is some evidence that the data fit better models of incomplete specialization, as 
implied by our equation (8) and (9), than models of complete specialization, as implied 
by equation (4). To test this proposition, Evenett and Keller (2002) apply the Grubel-
Lloyd index to construct an index of intra-industry trade using 1985 trade data at the 4-
digit SITC level from 58 (primarily industrial) countries. As already noted, the intra-
industry index is bound between zero (total absence of intra-industry trade) and one 
(trade takes only the form of intra-industry varieties). In practice, the index tends to be 




per cent of the sampled country pairs lying below the value of 0.05, which is taken by the 
authors as the demarcation line between homogeneous and differentiated production. 
Equation (4) is applied to data whose intra-industry index falls below 0.05. The unit 
coefficient on the incomes of the two trading partners is rejected by the data. We recall 
that equation (4) could have been generated from either differentiated varieties produced 
under increasing returns to scale or by homogenous produced in an H-O world with large 
differences in factor endowments. Empirically, the alternative of incomplete 
specialization fares much better. Equations (8) and (9) are tested with data whose intra-
industry trade index exceeds 0.05. For equation (9), the coefficients of the income 
variables should be positive (but below unity) and rising as the Grubel-Lloyd index rises. 
The findings do not reject these patterns. Equation (8) is tested for different classes of 
factor intensities –specifically different values of capital to worker ratios and a Grubel-
Lloyd index below 0.05--. Here as well the findings are consistent with equation (8). In 
sum, models of complete specialization overpredict bilateral trade flows and are rejected 
in favor of models of incomplete specialization.  
 
National borders and multilateral resistance 
National borders are a discontinuity of distance and an impediment to international trade. 
Costs take a jump at the border. First, there are transaction costs due to customs clearance 
and formalities. Furthermore, the border is a delimiter of differences in legal systems and 
practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, and monetary regimes. Finally, 




tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions. Border frictions are more difficult to quantify than 
distance-related frictions.  
The economic size of the national border is at center stage in McCallum (1995) 
who fits a modified form of equation (3) to 1988 exports and imports among ten 
Canadian provinces and 30 U.S. states. In addition to income and distance, McCallum’s 
GE codes a dummy variable equal to one for inter-provincial trade and zero for province-
to-state trade. The point estimate of the dummy variable, the size of the border effect, is 
approximately 3 and statistically significant under a variety of tests. Since the exponent 
of the coefficient of the dummy variable is approximately 20, McCallum’s findings imply 
that inter-provincial trade (i.e., trade within Canada) is approximately twenty times larger 
than trade between provinces and states (i.e., trade between Canada and the United 
States).  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have criticized McCallum’s results of very 
thick borders for ignoring the asymmetric impact on trade of barriers between small and 
large economies and multilateral protection levels. On the first point, these authors re-
estimated the gravity equation, using McCallum’s exact specification and data, 
alternatively from the viewpoint of Canada and the United States, and found that the 
border from the Canadian viewpoint is ten times as wide as from the viewpoint of the 
United States. Since Canada’s economy is approximately one-tenth of the United States’, 
the level of protection imbedded in a border is a positive function of the size of the 
economy. Helliwell (1996) has confirmed these findings with data for the province of 
Quebec, the author desiring to underscore, among other things, what Quebec would lose 




At a more fundamental level, Anderson and van Wincoop criticize those 
specifications of GE that ignore the interaction between bilateral and multilateral trading 
costs. Their basic contention is that bilateral trade flows depend on what goes on between 
a given country pair and the rest of the world; in other words, bilateral trade flows are 
determined by a general equilibrium framework. When multilateral trading costs rise 
relative to bilateral costs, trade flows rise between the country pair i and j; and vice versa. 
The authors arrive at a testable equation that resembles equation (5) above: 
 
(10)  Mij = (YiYj/ Yw)( tij/PiPj)
(1-σ). 
 
There are two differences between (10) and (5). The first concerns trading costs. We have 
seen that Anderson and van Wincoop criticize McCallum’s results on the ground that 
they ignore multilateral aspects of such costs. In (10), tij appears now in the numerator 
and it is deflated by price indexes of the trading partners, Pi and Pj, which in turn depend 
on all tij pairs, countries’  income shares and countries’ price levels. Thus, bilateral 
trading costs are divided by what Anderson and van Wincoop call ‘multilateral 
resistance’ factors. The second change concerns the exponent of the ratio of bilateral to 
multilateral resistance factors. The exponent is not one but (1-σ). The reason for this 
change comes from the fact that the hypothesized utility has a constant-elasticity of 
substitution, σ, between goods. This elasticity has been estimated to exceed one; the 
authors assume it to be five. In sum, an increase in multilateral resistance relative to 
bilateral resistance raises bilateral trade. The rest of (10) matches (5). This is because 




Define  tij = δijdij
 ρ, where dij is, as before, distance between the country pair, and  
δij = 1 if the two trading regions are located inside a given border or δij = 1 plus the tariff 
rate and if the two regions are located on opposite sides of a border. Substituting the 
definition of tij in (10), we obtain  
 
(11)  ln(Mij/YiYj ) = -ln (Yw) + (1-σ) ρln(dij) + (1-σ)ln(δij) - (1-σ) ln(Pi) 
- (1-σ) ln(Pj). 
 
Pi and Pj are a function of bilateral distance, border, and other unobserved variables that 
influence trading costs. The Ps have to be estimated for all the countries; for that 
Anderson and van Wincoop use nonlinear least squares to minimize the sum of squared 
errors. A simpler, but less efficient, alternative is to use country-specific dummies; more on this 
below. With all these adjustments, the authors obtain that for the bilateral trade between 
Canada and the United States the tariff-equivalent border rate is 51 per cent.
5 
In sum, Canada and the United States have intense and relatively open trade 
relations; yet, their border represents a considerable obstacle to further integration. To 
have a more complete picture of the border effect, we need to extend the work to other 
countries, both in the North and the South.
  
 
North and South trade 
Our last empirical topic deals with the application of GE to trade flows among developed 
countries (North), developing countries (South), and between the two sub-groups (North-South). 
                                                 




For this purpose, I shall use the WTA by Statistics of Canada, which consists of 215,500 
annual observations on bilateral imports, in U.S. dollars, covering 143 countries over the 
period 1980 to 2003. Details of the data set can be obtained by consulting the Indiana 
University CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm). The testable 
equation is a modified version of (3) 
 
 
(12)  ln(Mijt) = α 0 + α1ln(YiYj)t + α2ln(YiYj /Ni Nj)t + α3ln(dij) + α4 Fij + 
α5ln Pit + α6ln Pjt + uijt. 
 
Specification (12), unlike (3), imposes the restriction that the elasticity of trade flows 
with respect to income is the same for exporting and importing countries. In addition, 
(12) includes per-capita income and time-varying multilateral resistance factors Pit and 
Pjt. Bergstrand (1989) shows the relevance of per-capita income, which proxies for factor 
intensities in the GE. The multilateral trade factors were discussed in connection with the 
empirical work on the border effect. Unlike Anderson and Van Wincoop, I will account 
for these factors by the simpler procedure of using time-varying country-specific 
dummies (that is, country dummies interacting with years). A more comprehensive 
treatment of the econometric issues underlying the GE estimation with panel data can be 
found in Fratianni and Oh (2007). 
  Vector F includes affinity variables that are trade-enhancing. These fall into three 
categories: geographic affinity (common land border), cultural affinity (common 
                                                                                                                                                 




language, common colonizer, and colonial relationship), and institutional affinity (RTA 
membership and common currency). RTAs work like clubs and give members privileged 
access to a geographic area. There is a big literature on whether RTAs, on balance, create 
trade or divert trade against outsiders; see Fratianni and Oh (2007). Regionalism is 
defined in terms of eleven separate RTAs, covering 40 per cent of world trade; for a list 
of the RTAs, see Table 1 below. Since the RTAs have the potential to divert trade, (12) 
includes also an inter-regional dummy that is equal to one when the trading partners 
belong to different RTAs; otherwise it is zero. Trade diversion implies a negative 
coefficient. 
    Measurement and sources of the variables of equation (12) are shown in the 
Appendix. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample of countries as well 
as for the North, South, and North-South sub-groups. North is defined as the set of 
countries that are members of the OECD; South is defined as the non-OECD countries. 
The average bilateral import is $5.2 million, but in the North the average rises to $458.7 
million, whereas in the South falls to $1.6 million. Just as stark are the differences in 
income. The average multiplicative GDP (YiYj) in the North is 188 times the average for 
the South; the average multiplicative per-capita income in the North is 95 times the 
average for the South. Average distance is 4,589 miles, with a range spanning from 55 
miles (Bahrain and Qatar) to 12,351 miles (Guyana and Indonesia). Country-pair 
observations with RTA membership represent 21.3 per cent of the sample in the North 
but only 2.5 per cent in the South; those with a common land border represent 7.4 per 
cent in the North and 4.5 per cent in the South; those with a common currency 3.4 




cent in the North and 28 per cent in the South; those with a common colonizer are 
entirely located in the South; and those with a colonial relationship are much more 
frequent in the North than in the South. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
Estimates of equation (12) are presented in Table 2. Income and distance are 
powerful forces of bilateral trade and appear to be stable across different groups of 
countries. The elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to GDP is between 1.10 and 
1.20, the differences between North and South being quite minor. The elasticity of 
bilateral imports with respect to distance is -.99 for the North and -1.11 for the South (and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level), suggesting that trading 
costs are higher for developing countries than developed countries. To have an 
appreciation of the quantitative importance of distance, consider that the average of the 
log of distance is about 8.2 and that the average of the log of bilateral imports is 8.6. 
Since the distance elasticity is around unity, distance alone, on average, “destroys” 
almost the entire value of bilateral flows. Distance, we recall, captures more than mere 
transportation costs. The consensus is that the bulk of trading costs are due to trade-
reducing factors such as differences in legal systems, administrative practices, market 
structures, networks, languages and monetary regimes; see Grossman (1998, pp. 30-31).  
Membership to an RTA raises bilateral trade flows much more for the South and 
the North-South than for the North. On the other hand, the relatively low frequency of 
RTAs in the South may weaken the reliability of the estimates for South-South and 
North-South; for a more complete discussion of RTAs on trade flows, see Fratianni and 




that RTA membership has not hampered trade between countries that belong to two 
different trade clubs.  
The relationship between bilateral trade and a common currency appears to be 
unstable: it is strongly positive in the South, but statistically insignificant in the North. 
Again, as it is true for the RTAs, the reliability of these estimates may reflect the fact that 
frequency of currency unions in the South is very low both in an absolute sense and in 
relation to the frequency in the North. At this point, it is best to remain cautious on the 
quantitative importance of a common currency on trade. The initial estimates of Rose 
(2000) that countries with a common currency trade three times as much as countries 
with different currencies (and fluctuating exchange rates) has been met with some 
skepticism; see, for example, the comments to Rose by Persson (2001).  
Geographical affinity, proxied by a shared land border, is trade enhancing for the 
South but not for the North. The implicit assumption that a shared border leads to more 
trade is based on the presumption that neighboring countries have friendly relations and 
tend to cooperate more than distant countries. The alternative that close countries tend to 
be unfriendly and protect the home market more than distant countries cannot be 
dismissed, certainly not through reading of history. Cultural affinity, proxied by a 
common language, common colonizer and a shared colonial relationship expand trade 
across all sub-groups. Common language is more trade enhancing in the North than the 
South, while the opposite holds for colonial ties.  
In sum, the results of equation (12) should be judged as a success for the 
explanatory power of the gravity equation.  





The objective of this chapter was to provide a survey, albeit selective given space 
limitations, of the gravity equation in international trade. This equation started in the 
Sixties as a purely empirical proposition to explain bilateral trade flows, without little or 
no theoretical underpinnings. At the end of the Seventies, the gravity equation was 
rejuvenated and legitimized by a series of theoretical articles that demonstrated that the 
basic GE form was consistent with various models of trade flows. Empirical applications 
of GE expanded to cover a variety of issues, such as the impact of regional trade 
agreements, national borders and currency unions on trade, as well as the use of the 
equation to sort out the relative merit of alternative trade theories. A new wave of studies 
is now concentrating on the general equilibrium properties of the GE and finer 
econometrics points. The renewed interest of the academic profession in the development 




Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 









Mean for  
South-
South 
Mean for  
North-
South 
        
Number of observation  215,500  215,500  13,287  95,278  106,935 
       
Log of bilateral imports  8.5643  3.2514 13.0362  7.3605  9.0813 
Log of GDP  48.4699  2.7089  52.3583  47.1183  49.1911 
Log of per capita GDP  15.9096  2.0875  19.1618  14.6053  16.6676 
Log  of  distance  8.1953 0.7794 7.6219 8.1175 8.3349 
Common RTA
a  0.0258 0.1587 0.2131 0.0245 0.0038 
Inter-regional 0.1304  0.3368 0.1774 0.0812 0.1685 
Common land border  0.0268  0.1616  0.0741  0.0456  0.0042 
Common currency
b  0.0091 0.0948 0.0339 0.0137 0.0019 
Common  language  0.2140 0.4101 0.1199 0.2844 0.1629 
Common  colonizer  0.0804 0.2719  NA 0.1818  NA 
Colonial  relationship  0.0232 0.1505 0.0351 0.0021 0.0405 
       
Notes: 
a The eleven RTAs are: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association, 
the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Southern Common Market, the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market, the Andean Community of Nations, the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, the Central American Common Market, 
the Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement, the South Pacific 
Region Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, and the United States-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement; for more details see Fratianni and Oh (2007). 
b The list of monetary unions 
encompass the following areas: the U.S. dollar, the East Caribbean dollar, the Australian dollar, 





Table 2 Estimates of equation (12). Dependent variable: log of bilateral imports. Sample 
period: 1980-2003. 
 






















































































































































     
Obs. 
 




0.6557 0.8543 0.4686 0.6910 
 
Note: Equation (2) has been estimated with time-varying importing country fixed effects, which 
are not reported. Superscripts *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
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Appendix 1 Data description 
 
Variables  Descriptions  Data Sources  Units 
Bilateral Imports  Log of nominal bilateral imports  World Trade 
Analyzer
a 
Log of 1000 
US dollar 
Log of nominal 
GDP 
Log of the product of nominal GDPs.  World Development 
Indicator
b 
Log of dollar 
Log of nominal per 
capita GDP 





Log of dollar 
Log of Distance  Log of distance between trading partners  World Factbook
c  Log of mile 
Common Border  If two countries share a common border, 
Common Border = 1, otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable.  
Common language  If two countries share same main 
language, Common language = 1, 
otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable. 
Common Colonizer  If two countries had same colonizer, 
Common Colonizer = 1, otherwise 0.  
World Factbook




If two countries were involved in a 
colonial relationship with each other, 
Colonial Relationship = 1, otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable. 
Common Currency  If two countries share the same currency 
or a unit exchange rate, Common 






If two countries belong to the same RTA 
in the year of observation, Same-RTA = 
1, otherwise 0. 
WTO
d  Dummy 
variable. 
Inter-regional  If exporting and importing countries 
belongs to different RTAs, inter-regional 






a “World Trade Analyzer” (WTA) has been assembled and managed by Statistics Canada. 
Information of the data is available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/ads/trade/world.htm 
b The source for nominal GDP is World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”. When data are 
unavailable from World Bank, missing observations are filled from the “Penn World Table” and 
IMF’s “International Financial Statistics”. 
c “World Factbook”, CIA; http://www.cia.gov/coa/publication/factbook 
d The data available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e.htm 
e The basic source for currency unions is the IMF's “Schedule of Par Values” and issues of the 
IMF's “Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions”. Data are 
supplemented by the yearly “Statesman's Year Book”. 